

Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 099395

13

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INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 L-03 ACDA-19 CIAE-00 DODE-00

PM-07 H-03 INR-10 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01

SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 AF-10 ARA-16 EA-11 NEA-14 OIC-04

SAJ-01 SAM-01 /190 R

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R 140016Z MAY 74

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 099395

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UN, UR

SUBJECT: US-USSR CONSULTATIONS ON PEACEKEEPING

1. DEPT WISHES TO MOVE AHEAD IN NEW YORK WITH PROMPT AND POSIIVELY-TONED BUT, FOR TIME BEING, SUBSTANTIVELY MODEST RESPONSE TO SOVIET REPLY OF APRIL 29 TO US INITIATIVE ON PEACEKEEPING GUIDELINES. OUR RESPONSE HOWEVER WOULD NOT GO BEYOND OUR NOTE OF MARCH 11. DESPITE EMPTINESS OF SOVIET COMMENT WE INTEND TO MAINTAIN POSTURE OF GENERAL CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 099395

RECEPTIVITY BUT NOT ANXIETY CONCERNING PROGRESS OVER NEXT

PERIOD. CONCURRENTLY WE WISH TO CONSULT CLOSELY IN NEW YORK WITH BRITISH AND CANADIANS, AND POSSIBLY LATER BROADEN EXPOSITION OF VIEWS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY AMONG COMMITTEE OF 33 AND ITS WORKING GROUP.

2. FYI: DEPT IS DISAPPOINTED BY SOVIET REPLY, WHICH SINGLES OUT SC ROLE IN ACTUAL CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS BUT PAYS NO ATTENTION TO WHAT US NOTE SAID IN PARA E (1)-(3) ON THIS SUBJECT AND IGNORES ENTIRELY WHAT WE HAVE SAID ON ALL OTHER ASPECTS OF PEACEKEEPING. US NOTE LISTS PRE-LAUNCH DECISIONS FOR WHICH SC SHOULD HAVE RESPONSIBILITY, INCLUDING CONCESSIONS TO SOVIETS ON COMMANDER AND COMPOSITION OF FORCE (PARA C). IMPORTANTLY, HOWEVER, PARA E SPEAKS OF ENSURING CENTRAL SC ROLE IN POST-LAUNCH OPERATIONS BY (1) REGULAR SYG REPORTS; (2) PERIODIC SC REVIEW; (3) AN ART 29 COMMITTEE OR (4) OTHER MECHANISMS

FOR ADVICE AND CONSULTATION.

3. AS INDICATED, DEPT SEES NO ADVANTAGE IN FURTHER ELABORATION OF US POSITION IN ABSENCE OF ANY SOVIET COMMENT ON CONTENTS OF US NOTE. WE BELIEVE USSR SHOULD BE URGED TO STATE MORE FULLY AND SPECIFICALLY ITS VIEWS ON OUR OBSERVATIONS RATHER THAN BE ALLOWED TO GET AWAY WITH PLOY OF SEEKING FURTHER DEFINITION AND EXPOSURE OF US POSITION BEFORE REVEALING ANYTHING REGARDING ITS OWN.

4. WE DO NOT PRECLUDE MOVING TO MORE FORTHCOMING POSITION ON POST-LAUNCH DECISIONS AT LATER STAGE AND AFTER RECEIVING INITIAL SOVIET SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS ON OUR NOTE. AT MINIMUM WE WISH TO PRESERVE RECORD OF HAVING MOVED FORWARD ON PEACEKEEPING BY TIME OF NEXT GA IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECRETARY'S INITIATIVE. HOWEVER, IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, WE PREFER NOT TO FORESHADOW ACCEPTANCE OF VETO BY CHALLENGE, IN ABSENCE BETTER INDICATION OF SOVIET THINKING. MOREOVER, SINCE OUR OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE IS AGREEMENT ON GENERALIZED GUIDELINES, WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD AVOID DETAILED DISCUSSIONS ON LISTS OF POST-LAUNCH DECISIONS REQUIRING EITHER DIRECT SC APPROVAL OR VETO BY CHALLENGE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 099395

5. DEPT RECOGNIZES POSSIBLE PRESSURES FOR PROGRESS EMANATING FROM COMMITTEE OF 33; WE BELIEVE HOWEVER WE CAN CONTAIN SUCH PRESSURES FOR TIME BEING BY ALLUDING TO ON-GOING US-USSR DISCUSSIONS AND, BY BACKGROUNDING OUR PRINCIPAL ALLIES RE US-SOVIET TALKS IN ORDER AVOID IMPRESSION WE GETTING TOO FAR OUTIN FRONT WITH US-SOV INITIATIVE FROM WHICH THEY EXCLUDED. END FYI

6. IN LIGHT OF FOREGOING, WE SUGGEST USUN REPLY TO SMUN, PREFERABLY IN WRITING, ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

A. WE ARE DISAPPOINTED AT LACK OF SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT ON SUGGESTIONS MADE IN OUR NOTE OF MARCH 11.

B. WE ARE OF COURSE PREPARED TO DISCUSS SC ROLE IN CONDUCT OF PKOS. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE DRAW USSR'S ATTENTION TO OBSERVATIONS OUTLINED IN PARA E OF OUR NOTE, ON WHICH WE WOULD WELCOME THEIR COMMENTS. THIS PARA OUTLINED OUR VIEW OF SC ROLE WHILE PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS UNDERWAY AND SUGGESTED PROCEDURES DESIGNED TO MEET PRECISE POINTS RAISED BY SOVIET REPLY OF APRIL 29. WITH REFERENCE TO SUBPARA (3) OF PARA E, THE EXPERIENCE OF UNFICYP AND UNEF II DEMONSTRATE THAT MECHANISMS OTHER THAN AN ARTICLE 29 COMMITTEE ARE FEASIBLE AND SHOULD BE SUBJECT OF CAREFUL CONSIDERATION.

C. WE ALSO DRAW SOVIETS' ATTENTION TO LIST DETAILED PARA C OF US NOTE OF DECISIONS FOR WHICH SC SHOULD, IN US VIEW, BE RESPONSIBLE. SOVIETS WILL NOTE THAT WE HAVE ALSO STRIVEN HERE TO MEET USSR CONCERNS BY AGREEING THAT SYG RECOMMENDATIONS ON COMMANDER AND COMPOSITION OF FORCE SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THESE DECISIONS. WE HAVE ALSO LISTED IN LAST PARA OF NOTE STANDBY ARRANGEMENTS WHICH SC MIGHT AUTHORIZE SYG TO UNDERTAKE.

D. US GENUINELY INTERESTED IN DISCUSSING ALL ASPECTS OF PEACEKEEPING WITH USSR, AND IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON GENERALIZED GUIDELINES. WE BELIEVE OUR NOTE AMPLY DEMONSTRATED THIS DESIRE, AND WOULD FIND SPECIFIC SOVIET CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 099395

OBSERVATIONS ON IT BOTH HELPFUL AND VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION TO CONTINUING DIALOGUE. IT IS OF COURSE UNDERSTOOD THAT AGREEMENT ON ANY PARTICULAR GUIDELINE WILL BE CONDITIONAL ON AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE GUIDELINES AS A WHOLE. NOTING THAT COMMITTEE OF 33 IS ANXIOUS TO PROCEED, WE HOPE WE MAY HAVE BENEFIT OF DETAILED SOVIET VIEWS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

7. PRIOR TO APPROACHING SOVS, USUN SHOULD INFORM THE BRITISH AND CANADIANS OF THE STATE OF PLAY IN OUR PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS, SHOULD OUTLINE TO THEM FOREGOING RESPONSE TO SOVIETS, CONSULT ON NEXT STEPS AND PROSPECTS, AND SOUND THEM OUT CONCERNING DESIRABILITY AND TIMING OF ANY WIDER SHARING OF VIEWS AMONG WORKING GROUP AND COMMITTEE OF 33. WE SEE CERTAIN

DANGER IN ALLOWING TOO MUCH TIME TO PASS WITHOUT SHARING
GENERALLY OUR CURRENT VIEWS AND INFO ON US-USSR DIS-
CUSSIONS WITH KEY MEMBERS OF WG AND COMITE, E.G., BRAZIL,
JAPAN, FRANCE AND EGYPT. WE WISH TO DAMPEN IMPATIENCE OF
WG MEMBERS AND ENSURE THAT THEY HAVE PROPER IMPRESSION OF
OUR BILATERALS WITH SOVS AND OUR FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE ON
PKO GUIDELINES.

8. FOR MOSCOW: WE WILL WANT EMBASSY TO REINFORCE
DISCUSSION IN NEW YORK BY CONVEYING US RESPONSE TO MFA AT
ISSRAELYAN LEVEL OR HIGHER. HOWEVER, WE WILL INSTRUCT
EMBASSY SEPARATELY AFTER RECEIVING REPORT US-USSR CON-
TACT IN NEW YORK. RUSH

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